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My thought on Nicholas Humphrey on the Invention of Consciousness on CTT

Updated: Mar 18, 2023

Excellent discussion on CTT - Nicholas Humphrey on the Invention of Consciousness | Closer To Truth Chats. Below are my thoughts on this:

First off, I agree with Nicholas on Illusionism and Panpsychism.


I agree 100% with Nicholas about how the word "illusionism" is understood by the lay people and even philosophers who oppose it. I have brought this to Keith's and Dan's attention several times. Illusionism has a branding problem. People who oppose it many times take it as a derogatory explanation. They go - what the heck do you mean that the experience of seeing a red apple is a illusion" (which they also take it as an accusation of being delusional). IMO what Dan and Keith are saying is that the attribution of that experience to some non-physical notion of consciousness is an illusion, but not the experience itself. It is just that the mechanisms of receiving the sensory input, processing it and interpreting is as a perception are all in the physical processes inside the brain. If any of these stages were non-functioning then the end result - subjective experience (which by the way the same brain that classifies and reports) will not occur.

At about 50:15, the discussion turns to anti-physicalist ideas. IMO, the advances in neuro-science, computing, and AI and advent of physical based AIs like ChatGPT and the possibility of them going effectively sentient is making a lot of people, opposed to physicalism, nervous. IMO, a lot of discussion of panpsychism, dualism, and idealism is a kind of immune response.


I think folks here will agree that ChatGPT or successors of that are physical based systems (no supernatural magic) and the possibility of these systems becoming effectively sentient in specific ways consistent with the limited physical capability of text only input/output capabilities, is growing at rapid pace day by day. Once it happens people will not have any choice but to accept physicalism, unless they start claiming that at the same time the physical capabilities of these AIs reached the same level, something coincidently blew some magic into these system to make them sentient. For that magical thinking, physicalism will not have any answer and nor should it try.


At 46:09 Nicholas nailed the Mary's room experiment comment. IMO Mary's room experiment is a red herring just like conceivability of p-zombies. It is time to retire those ideas. What is the big deal about Mary being locked in black and white room and then coming out into a colorful world. What is the big deal? The same can be said about pretty much any new experience one has. Obviously one did not have that exact experience before they had that particular new experience for the first time, duh! Secondly the word know gets used in two different ways in the context of Mary's room experiment, which misleads us. When it is said that inside the room she KNEW every thing about color perception, the word KNEW there means she understands the mechanisms - physics of light, anatomy of the eye, physiology and bio-chemistry and electro chemistry of the brain, the networked dynamics of large amount of neurons and dynamic behavior and functioning (even abstract) of large number of connected nodes. The KNEW = UNDESTOOD. When Mary steps out of the black and white room - it is said she now KNOWS about how it feels like to see a colored object. Here the word KNOWS does not mean understand. It means experiences. KNOWS = EXPERIENCES. Thus KNOWS inside the room is not the same as KNOWS outside the room and the two should not be confused. IMO, from scientific understanding and theorizing perspective only the former (KNOWS=UNDERSTANDS) is important, the later (KNOWS=EXPERIENCES) is not important. And thus the later should not be given a big importance when arguing against physicalism. Based on her understanding if she could predict what will be perceived by another person then that is good enough. Scientific theory is about a compressed, general understanding of a principle or a phenomenon. It is not an enumeration of every possible instance of that phenomenon. GR predicts an orbit of a planet around a star (say!). It does not enumerate and does not have to enumerate every orbit of every possible planet around a star in the universe. The scientific theory does not have to do that. It is not meant to do that. Mary's room experiment tries to be a gotcha argument but fails.


Here is my dialog about Marys' room experiment with ChatGPT:


Me:

In Frank Jackson proposed Mary's black and white room experiment the word knows is used in two different ways. Inside the room she knows everything about physics of light, color perception. In that context the word knows is used to mean understand. When she steps out into colorful world and sees a red object, she knows how it feels to see a red object. In this context the word knows is used to mean experiences. Do you agree?


ChatGPT:

Yes, I agree with your interpretation of the two different ways in which the word "knows" is used in Mary's black and white room thought experiment.


Inside the black and white room, Mary has all the knowledge and understanding of the physics of light, color perception, and how the brain processes visual information, but she has never experienced seeing colors. In this context, the word "knows" refers to Mary's understanding of the concept of color, based on her knowledge and expertise in the field.

However, once Mary steps out of the room and experiences seeing a red object for the first time, she gains a new kind of knowledge, namely, the knowledge of what it is like to experience the color red. In this context, the word "knows" refers to Mary's personal experience and subjective understanding of what it is like to see and perceive colors, which cannot be gained solely through knowledge and understanding of the physics of color and light.


So, in summary, the word "knows" is used in two different ways in Mary's black and white room experiment: to refer to knowledge and understanding, and to refer to personal experience and subjective understanding.


Me:

So to make a theory of consciousness as a physical phenomenon, the first meaning of the word knows i.e. understands is important. The later knows i.e. experiences is just a specific instance of the knowledge she has about how the color perception works is not important to any significant degree.


ChatGPT:

Yes, that's correct. To create a theory of consciousness as a physical phenomenon, it is important to focus on the first meaning of the word "knows," which refers to understanding and knowledge of the physical processes that give rise to conscious experiences. This involves studying the neural and physiological mechanisms underlying conscious perception, attention, memory, and other cognitive processes.


The second meaning of the word "knows," which refers to personal experience and subjective understanding, is a specific instance of the knowledge gained through understanding the physical processes underlying consciousness. While personal experience is important for understanding subjective aspects of consciousness, it is ultimately a product of the physical processes underlying consciousness, and thus can be explained in terms of those physical processes.


Therefore, a theory of consciousness as a physical phenomenon should focus on understanding the physical mechanisms underlying conscious experience, rather than solely relying on personal experiences or subjective understanding.


Me:

Therefore the Frank Jackson's Mary's room experiment is really not a significant attack on physicalism. The incremental additional experience of seeing red is not of much value as a serious counter argument against physicalism. Let me give an example, General Relativity predicts an orbit of a planet around star. It obviously does not enumerate every orbit of every planet in the universe. So as long as GR can predict the orbit of any planet, it is a good theory.


ChatGPT:

Yes, that's a reasonable interpretation of Frank Jackson's Mary's room thought experiment. While the thought experiment does highlight the idea that personal experience and subjective understanding are an important aspect of consciousness, it does not necessarily provide a strong argument against physicalism.


As you mentioned, the incremental additional experience of seeing red is not necessarily of much value in terms of challenging the idea that consciousness can be explained in terms of physical processes. This is because the physicalist view holds that subjective experience is ultimately a product of physical processes in the brain, and can be explained in terms of those processes.


Furthermore, the idea that a theory must be able to explain every possible instance or variation of a phenomenon in order to be considered valid is not necessarily true. As long as a theory can account for a wide range of observations and make accurate predictions, it can still be considered a good and useful theory.


In the case of physicalism and the study of consciousness, while there may be aspects of subjective experience that are difficult to explain solely in terms of physical processes, the overall trend in research suggests that consciousness can indeed be explained in terms of neural and physiological mechanisms. Therefore, while the Mary's room thought experiment may raise interesting questions about consciousness and subjective experience, it does not necessarily undermine the physicalist view.




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