The discussion is informal (obviously - duh) but in the end it is interesting.
ME:
If ChatGPT like AI becomes conscious, will it help or hurt philosophical position of physicalism?
ChatGPT:
As an AI language model, I do not possess consciousness or the ability to make decisions about my own actions, so I cannot help or hurt the philosophical position of physicalism.
Physicalism is the philosophical position that everything that exists is ultimately physical in nature, and can be explained by physical laws and processes. Whether or not AI can become conscious is still a topic of debate among philosophers and scientists, and it is not clear how the emergence of AI consciousness would affect the position of physicalism.
If AI were to become conscious, it would raise important questions about the nature of consciousness and the relationship between the physical and the mental. This could lead to new insights and developments in the field of philosophy of mind, and could potentially challenge or refine existing positions, including physicalism. However, the impact of AI consciousness on philosophical positions is still speculative and subject to ongoing debate and discussion.
ME:
Well do you consider systems like ChatGPT are based on physical basis or not?
ChatGPT:
Yes, as an AI language model, ChatGPT is based on physical hardware and software systems that operate according to the laws of physics. The computer hardware that runs ChatGPT is composed of physical components such as processors, memory, and storage, and the software that enables ChatGPT to function is written in code that is executed by those physical components.
Moreover, ChatGPT's ability to generate responses is based on machine learning algorithms that are trained on vast amounts of data, which are stored and processed on physical servers and data centers. All of these physical components and processes are necessary for ChatGPT to function as an AI language model.
Therefore, ChatGPT is an example of a physical system that is able to perform complex tasks using machine learning and natural language processing techniques, and its operation is entirely based on physical principles.
ME:
Therefore if, without change of underlying technology a system like ChatGPT becomes conscious, by simple logic it will prove physicalism, correct?
ChatGPT:
The question of whether a system like ChatGPT can become conscious is still a topic of philosophical and scientific debate, and it is not clear if this is possible or how it would happen.
However, if we assume that a system like ChatGPT could become conscious without any changes to its underlying technology, then it would certainly have implications for the philosophical position of physicalism.
Physicalism asserts that everything that exists is ultimately physical in nature, and can be explained by physical laws and processes. If a physical system like ChatGPT were able to become conscious, then it would suggest that consciousness is also a physical phenomenon that can be explained by physical laws and processes.
This would support the physicalist view, as it would demonstrate that consciousness is not some kind of non-physical or supernatural phenomenon that cannot be explained by physical processes. However, it is important to note that the question of whether or not consciousness can be fully explained by physical processes is still a topic of philosophical debate, and many philosophers and scientists hold non-physicalist views on this issue.
ME:
I am not talking about support. I am talking about such scenario proving physicalism if corre correct, right?
ChatGPT:
Yes, if a physical system like ChatGPT were to become conscious without any changes to its underlying technology, it would provide evidence in support of the physicalist view that everything that exists is ultimately physical in nature, and can be explained by physical laws and processes.
This is because the emergence of consciousness in a physical system like ChatGPT would suggest that consciousness is not some kind of non-physical or supernatural phenomenon that cannot be explained by physical processes, but rather a natural outcome of physical processes.
However, it is important to note that the question of whether consciousness can be fully explained by physical processes is still a topic of philosophical debate, and many philosophers and scientists hold non-physicalist views on this issue. Therefore, even if a physical system like ChatGPT were to become conscious, it would not necessarily settle the debate about the nature of consciousness or the validity of physicalism as a philosophical position.
ME:
Well if people opposing physicalism can use conceivability of p-zombies as a argument against physicalism, isn't is equivalent to use conceivability of conscious ChatGPT as a argument for physicalism?
ChatGPT:
The argument from conceivability is a philosophical argument that has been used both for and against physicalism. According to this argument, if it is conceivable that there could be beings that are physically identical to human beings but lack consciousness (often referred to as "philosophical zombies" or "p-zombies"), then this suggests that consciousness is not identical to any physical properties or processes, and therefore physicalism is false.
However, it is also possible to turn this argument around and use the conceivability of conscious ChatGPT as an argument for physicalism, as you suggested. If it is conceivable that a physical system like ChatGPT could become conscious without any non-physical components or processes, then this would suggest that consciousness is ultimately physical in nature and can be explained by physical processes, which supports the physicalist view.
However, it's worth noting that the argument from conceivability is not universally accepted as a valid argument for or against physicalism, and there are many philosophical objections to this argument on both sides. Therefore, the conceivability of conscious ChatGPT, or any other scenario, is not by itself sufficient to settle the debate about the nature of consciousness or the validity of physicalism as a philosophical position.
ME:
if conceivability of p-zombies is allowed as an argument against physicalism, by same token, conceivability of AI like ChatGPT being conscious should be allowed as an argument for physicalism, right?
ChatGPT:
The argument from conceivability is a controversial philosophical argument that has been used both for and against physicalism. If we accept the argument from conceivability as a valid argument, then it would be consistent to use the conceivability of AI like ChatGPT being conscious as an argument for physicalism.
If it is conceivable that a physical system like ChatGPT could become conscious without any non-physical components or processes, then this would suggest that consciousness is ultimately physical in nature and can be explained by physical processes, which supports the physicalist view.
However, it's important to note that there are many objections to the argument from conceivability, and it is not universally accepted as a valid argument for or against physicalism. Therefore, whether or not the conceivability of AI like ChatGPT being conscious is a valid argument for physicalism is still a topic of philosophical debate and discussion.
ME:
ChatGPT is a system based on physicalism, assuming that conceivability is a valid argument, and it is possible to conceive that ChatGPT is conscious, it will not only support but by straightforward logic prove physicalism right?
ChatGPT:
If we assume that the argument from conceivability is valid and that it is possible to conceive that a physical system like ChatGPT could become conscious, then it would support the physicalist view that consciousness is ultimately physical in nature and can be explained by physical processes.
However, it's important to note that the argument from conceivability is not universally accepted as a valid argument for or against physicalism, and many philosophers and scientists hold non-physicalist views on the nature of consciousness.
Furthermore, even if we accept the argument from conceivability as valid, it would not necessarily provide a definitive or conclusive proof of physicalism, as there may still be other objections or arguments against physicalism that would need to be addressed.
Therefore, while the conceivability of a conscious ChatGPT may support the physicalist view, it would not necessarily prove physicalism right in a straightforward logical sense. The nature of consciousness and the validity of physicalism as a philosophical position remain topics of ongoing philosophical debate and discussion.
ME:
Oh...can you clarify - "Furthermore, even if we accept the argument from conceivability as valid, it would not necessarily provide a definitive or conclusive proof of physicalism, as there may still be other objections or arguments against physicalism that would need to be addressed." Considering the above discussion, if ChatGPT is found to be conscious, it will prove physicalism is true. What could be any objection to it?
If ChatGPT were found to be conscious, it would certainly provide support for the physicalist view that consciousness is ultimately physical in nature and can be explained by physical processes. However, it would not necessarily provide a definitive or conclusive proof of physicalism, as there may be other objections or arguments against physicalism that would need to be addressed.
One possible objection to the conclusion that ChatGPT's consciousness proves physicalism is the so-called "explanatory gap" or "hard problem" of consciousness. This is the idea that even if we can explain the functional and physical aspects of consciousness, there still remains a subjective or experiential aspect of consciousness that cannot be fully captured by physical explanations. Some philosophers argue that this subjective aspect of consciousness is irreducible to physical processes, and therefore physicalism is false.
Another objection to physicalism is the possibility of multiple realizability, which is the idea that different physical systems could give rise to the same mental states or experiences. For example, it is conceivable that a conscious ChatGPT could be created using a different physical substrate, such as biological neurons, which would suggest that consciousness is not strictly tied to any one physical system or process.
Finally, there are also non-physicalist views of consciousness that do not rely on the conceivability of p-zombies or conscious ChatGPTs. For example, some philosophers argue that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of the universe, akin to space and time, and cannot be reduced to physical processes or properties.
Therefore, while the conceivability of a conscious ChatGPT may provide support for physicalism, it would not necessarily provide a definitive or conclusive proof, and there may still be other objections or arguments that need to be addressed.
ME:
Nope...I am not talking about any specific physical system. I am simply talking about any or many different physical system and nothing extra can produce consciousness, then physicalism is proven.
ChatGPT:
If we assume that any or many different physical systems and nothing extra can produce consciousness, then it would support the physicalist view that consciousness is ultimately physical in nature and can be explained by physical processes.
However, it's important to note that physicalism is a philosophical position that is based on the assumption that the world can be fully described by physical laws and entities. While physicalism has been influential in many areas of philosophy and science, it remains a topic of ongoing debate and discussion, and there are still many open questions and objections to the physicalist view.
For example, there may be some aspects of consciousness, such as subjective experience or qualia, that are not fully captured by physical descriptions or explanations. Some philosophers argue that these aspects of consciousness cannot be reduced to physical processes and that physicalism is therefore incomplete or mistaken.
Furthermore, even if it were the case that nothing extra can produce consciousness, there may be other philosophical positions, such as panpsychism or idealism, that could offer alternative explanations for the nature of consciousness that do not rely on physicalism.
Therefore, while the possibility of a physical system producing consciousness may support the physicalist view, it would not necessarily provide a definitive or conclusive proof of physicalism, and there may still be other objections or alternative views that need to be considered.
ME:
Well, if we use the shorthand consciousness to include subjective experience or qualia and if a physical system and nothing non-physical produces such consciousness, then by definition physicalism is true. What is wrong with this logic that you can point at?
ChatGPT:
If we define consciousness to include subjective experience or qualia, and if a physical system and nothing non-physical produces such consciousness, then it would support the physicalist view that consciousness is ultimately physical in nature and can be explained by physical processes.
The logic you've presented is valid, assuming that we accept the premise that consciousness is entirely reducible to physical processes. However, as I mentioned earlier, there are still ongoing debates and discussions about the nature of consciousness, and some philosophers argue that subjective experience or qualia cannot be fully captured by physical descriptions or explanations.
For example, philosopher David Chalmers has argued that the subjective experience of consciousness poses a "hard problem" for physicalism, because it is difficult to see how purely physical processes could give rise to such experiences. Chalmers argues that subjective experience is a fundamental aspect of the universe, not reducible to physical processes, and that we need to develop new theories and concepts to fully understand it.
Similarly, philosopher Thomas Nagel has argued that subjective experience is not reducible to objective physical descriptions, and that we need to develop a new kind of "subjective" science to fully understand it.
Therefore, while the logic you've presented is valid assuming that consciousness is entirely reducible to physical processes, there are still ongoing debates and discussions about the nature of consciousness, and there may be other objections or alternative views that need to be considered.
ME:
Well, I do not understand. Like I said if a physical system produces consciousness - and all proponents and opponents of physicalism agree that the system is conscious, what objection can be raised. Are opponents using some other, hidden definition of consciousness?
ChatGPT:
If a physical system produces consciousness, and all proponents and opponents of physicalism agree that the system is conscious, then it would support the physicalist view that consciousness is ultimately physical in nature.
However, the debates and objections I mentioned earlier are based on the possibility that consciousness may not be entirely reducible to physical processes. Some opponents of physicalism argue that there are aspects of consciousness, such as subjective experience or qualia, that cannot be fully captured by physical descriptions or explanations.
For example, philosopher Frank Jackson presented the "knowledge argument" against physicalism, which is based on the idea that there are certain aspects of conscious experience that cannot be fully captured by physical descriptions. Jackson's argument imagines a scientist named Mary who knows everything there is to know about the physical nature of color, but has never actually experienced color herself. According to Jackson, when Mary finally experiences color for the first time, she learns something new about consciousness that cannot be fully captured by physical descriptions alone.
Similarly, philosopher Joseph Levine has argued that there is a "explanatory gap" between physical processes and subjective experience, which cannot be fully bridged by physical explanations alone.
Therefore, opponents of physicalism may argue that even if a physical system produces consciousness, there may still be aspects of consciousness that cannot be fully explained by physical processes, and that physicalism may be incomplete or mistaken as a result.
ME:
Hmmm...you are back to making same argument. I thought we agreed that the term consciousness in this discussion is to include subjective experience or qualia.
ChatGPT:
Yes, I agree that the term consciousness, in this discussion, includes subjective experience or qualia. If a physical system produces consciousness that includes subjective experience or qualia, and all proponents and opponents of physicalism agree that the system is conscious, then it would support the physicalist view that consciousness is ultimately physical in nature.
However, as I mentioned earlier, opponents of physicalism may argue that even if a physical system produces consciousness that includes subjective experience or qualia, there may still be aspects of consciousness that cannot be fully explained by physical processes, and that physicalism may be incomplete or mistaken as a result.
For example, some philosophers argue that there is a gap between the subjective experience of consciousness and the objective descriptions of physical processes, which cannot be fully bridged by physical explanations alone. While a physical system may produce consciousness, it may not fully capture the subjective experience or qualia of consciousness, and there may be limitations to our understanding of consciousness that are not fully explained by physicalism.
ME:
Well just by saying "there may still be aspects of consciousness that cannot be fully explained" is not an argument. They will need to specify what those aspects are right? Otherwise there cannot be any discussion and then their argument become "just because" they y say so argument right?
ChatGPT:
Yes, opponents of physicalism need to specify what those aspects of consciousness are that cannot be fully explained by physical processes. They need to provide evidence or arguments that demonstrate that these aspects of consciousness cannot be reduced to physical explanations, and that physicalism is incomplete or mistaken as a result.
For example, proponents of the knowledge argument, such as Frank Jackson, argue that subjective experience or qualia cannot be fully captured by physical descriptions, and that there is something about these aspects of consciousness that cannot be fully explained by physicalism. They argue that Mary's experience of seeing color for the first time provides evidence that subjective experience is not reducible to physical descriptions alone.
Similarly, proponents of the explanatory gap argument, such as Joseph Levine, argue that there is a gap between the subjective experience of consciousness and the objective descriptions of physical processes, which cannot be fully bridged by physical explanations alone. They argue that even if physical processes can explain some aspects of consciousness, there may be other aspects that cannot be fully reduced to physical explanations.
Therefore, opponents of physicalism need to provide specific arguments and evidence that demonstrate that there are aspects of consciousness that cannot be fully explained by physical processes, and that physicalism is incomplete or mistaken as a result.
ME:
I think Frank Jackson's argument is bogus and a red herring and a diversion. I think experience is not same as knowledge. In general relativity we understand gravity being curvature of spacetime caused by a massive object. With that we can predict an orbit of a planet around a star. Can we then claim that because there is no mention of orbit of specific planet like Jupiter around specific start like our Sun, that there is something lacking in GR? I do not think so. A specific experience which is a instance of an understood phenomenon, is just that - yet another instance o fthe principle.
ChatGPT:
... stopped
ME:
Well for making an argument "that there is something about these aspects of consciousness that cannot be fully explained by physicalism." we do not need to lock Mary in black and white room and then bring her out to see color etc. Any new experience, even simply, the experience of next moment in time is a new experience which she did not have before. But by principle of generality, there is nothing new about experience of the next moment. Why the drama about black and white room and colored outside word. It is redundant.
ChatGPT:
Your point is well-taken. Opponents of physicalism do not necessarily need to rely on thought experiments like Jackson's "Mary's Room" to argue that there are aspects of consciousness that cannot be fully explained by physicalism. As you suggest, the experience of any new moment in time could be considered an instance of something that physicalism may not be able to fully explain.
However, the reason that thought experiments like "Mary's Room" have gained popularity is because they are designed to highlight the intuitive pull of the idea that subjective experience or qualia cannot be fully captured by physical descriptions. Even if the experience of a new moment in time is an instance of something that physicalism cannot fully explain, it may not be as intuitively compelling as the idea that there is something fundamentally different about the experience of seeing color for the first time, as in Jackson's thought experiment.
Nonetheless, the point remains that opponents of physicalism need to provide specific arguments and evidence that demonstrate that there are aspects of consciousness that cannot be fully explained by physical processes, and that physicalism is incomplete or mistaken as a result. These arguments and evidence should be subject to critical evaluation and scrutiny, just like any other scientific or philosophical argument.
ME:
But having new experience, if t does not add anything qualitatively different, then the new experience cannot be used a an argument against physicalism. Let me give an example. Let us say Mary understand the spectrum of visible light and notion of intensity. She shows herself - first time - light green and dark green to understand what it means for a color to be light and dark. Similarly she then shows herself - first time - light blue and dark blue color to understand what it means for a color to be light and dark. Then she shows herself light red color. They she sets us a dark red object by choosing red frequency and intensity, but does not look at it. Then she says and imagines she will see dark red color. Then she looks at that dark red object and finds that she imagined it correctly. Isn't that predictive power good enough for physicalism?
ChatGPT:
Yes, the predictive power of physicalism in this example would support the idea that consciousness arises from physical processes. If Mary's understanding of the physical properties of light and color allow her to accurately predict her experience of seeing the dark red object, then it suggests that the physical processes underlying her consciousness can account for her subjective experience. This is consistent with the physicalist position that subjective experience arises from physical processes in the brain.
ME:
Here is another example. Let us say Mary learns about two dimensional Euclidean geometry, the notion of points and distances in that geometry. She has not seen a circle yet. Then she tries to imagine a set of points 1 unit away in each direction on a two dimensional surface and she predicts that she will see a circle. Then she is shown an actual circle. And she confirms her prediction. Isn't that predictive power good enough for physicalism?
ChatGPT:
Yes, in both cases, Mary's ability to accurately predict her experience based on her understanding of physical principles is a strong argument in favor of physicalism. It demonstrates that her experience is not something "over and above" the physical principles that govern the world, but rather is fully explicable in terms of those principles. If physicalism were false, we might expect Mary to have experiences that could not be predicted based on her physical knowledge, but this does not appear to be the case.
ME:
Do you think that in the second example there is any possibility of Mary being wrong? Will any of the opponents of physicalism will honestly, possibly say that Mary will not be able to predict a circle? If the answer is no, then with this simple thought experiment we have proven physicalism.
ChatGPT:
It is true that in the second example, it is highly unlikely that Mary would be wrong in predicting the appearance of a circle based on her understanding of two-dimensional Euclidean geometry. This thought experiment does suggest that physicalism can provide a predictive framework for certain aspects of conscious experience.
However, it is worth noting that this thought experiment only addresses one aspect of consciousness and does not necessarily prove physicalism to be true in all aspects. As we discussed earlier, opponents of physicalism argue that there may be aspects of consciousness that physicalism cannot fully explain, and these objections would still need to be addressed. Additionally, the predictive power of physicalism in one aspect of consciousness does not necessarily prove it to be true in all other aspects.
ME:
Well, what are those aspects? They need to be enumerated so that we can discuss about them right?
ChatGPT:
There are different aspects that opponents of physicalism may claim cannot be fully explained by physicalism. Some of these aspects include:
Subjective experience or qualia: opponents of physicalism argue that there is something inherently subjective about conscious experience that cannot be fully explained by physical processes.
Free will: some opponents of physicalism argue that free will is not compatible with a purely physical view of the world.
Intentionality: some argue that intentionality, or the capacity of mental states to refer to or be about things outside of themselves, cannot be fully explained by physicalism.
Unity of consciousness: some argue that the unity of conscious experience, or the fact that we experience a continuous stream of consciousness, cannot be fully explained by physicalism.
These are just a few examples of the kinds of aspects that opponents of physicalism may claim cannot be fully explained by physicalism.
ME:
Well, if we remove a physical substrate, can there be a free standing Free will. Can there be a free will without memory. Without the desires and hopes behind the free will?
ChatGPT:
The concept of free will is a complex philosophical issue that has been debated for centuries. While there is no definitive answer, some philosophers argue that free will can only exist in the context of a physical substrate, such as the brain. This is because the choices we make and the actions we take are thought to be determined by the physical processes that occur in the brain.
Without a physical substrate, it is difficult to conceive of how free will could exist. If we were to remove the brain, for example, it is unclear how free will could be exercised. In addition, memory, desires, and hopes are all thought to be crucial components of the decision-making process that underlies free will. Without these components, it is difficult to see how free will could be exercised in any meaningful sense.
However, some philosophers have argued that free will could exist independently of the physical world, perhaps in the realm of the supernatural or the spiritual. This view is not widely accepted in contemporary philosophy, however, as it is difficult to conceive of how such a non-physical entity could interact with the physical world.
ME:
Well anything could be argued to exist - especially in the realm of the supernatural or the spiritual. Harry Potter could exist. But does it not beg the question or at minimum diverts from the discussion at hand. We are talking about what actually happens in the physical world.
ChatGPT:
You make a good point. The discussion of what actually exists or happens in the physical world is based on empirical evidence and scientific inquiry. Claims about supernatural or spiritual entities or phenomena are not subject to the same empirical scrutiny and may not be testable or falsifiable through scientific methods. Therefore, they are not part of the current scientific understanding of the physical world and are not relevant to the discussion of physicalism as a scientific theory.
ME:
Ok...so not that we are back to the discussion we were having, all the examples aspects you gave above, can they exists without physical substrate?
ChatGPT:
As far as we currently understand, there is no evidence to suggest that any of the aspects of consciousness I mentioned could exist without a physical substrate. The current scientific understanding is that consciousness arises from the activity of the brain, which is a physical system. While there may be philosophical arguments that suggest otherwise, these arguments have not been supported by empirical evidence. Therefore, it remains an open question whether consciousness can exist without a physical substrate.